Yesterday in constitutional law class, we discussed New York v. Clinton (1998), and with the extremely obvious parallels to the political and legal landscape today, I couldn’t believe I was cold-called. Yea, the Socratic method is alive and well in law school. My professor—who happens to be my favorite—is about as politically different from me as it gets. And yet, I respect him and with his mastery of the topic and perspective from the other side of the coin, I learn a ton every class. Maybe, just maybe, we don’t have to cut off family and friends who think differently than we do. Can you imagine?
As I sat there, thinking about the ruling, I had a moment of realization—I actually agreed with the Court’s decision. The Line Item Veto Act gave the president the power to cancel specific spending provisions without sending them back to Congress. The Court ruled that unconstitutional, and it made sense. The president isn’t supposed to be a one-man legislative branch.
But that ruling has massive implications today. Because now, with a $2 trillion deficit and $37 trillion in national debt, we have a situation where government spending isn’t always a line item—it’s often a vague appropriation with agency discretion. So what happens if the executive branch just… doesn’t spend the money? That’s a legal question we’ve never fully answered.
And the person pushing all of these questions into the courts? Donald Trump. Whether he’s doing it by strategy or instinct, he’s forcing the Supreme Court to rule on everything—once and for all.
The Long March of Executive Power: From FDR to Trump
I’ve always been fascinated by how executive power has evolved. FDR, for example, didn’t just expand the presidency—he fundamentally transformed it. With over 3,700 executive orders, he created the playbook for broad executive action. But more than that, he built the administrative state, where federal agencies could make rules, enforce them, and judge violations—all within the executive branch.
For decades, this system thrived because of Chevron deference, which told courts to defer to agency interpretations of laws. Basically, Congress could write vague laws, and agencies could then decide what they meant. It was a shortcut around separation of powers, and it let unelected bureaucrats build a shadow government of regulations that no one voted for.
But now, it’s all coming undone. The Supreme Court’s West Virginia v. EPA (2022) decision was a direct attack on agency overreach, saying that if Congress didn’t explicitly give an agency a power, it didn’t have it. And with Chevron deference out, courts are finally telling agencies, “No, you don’t get to make the rules anymore.” With SEC v. Jarkesy (2024), ruling that the SEC can’t levy fines without a trial by jury, the days where agencies functioned as rule makers, enforcement and the judiciary, violating the separation of powers, are over.
Trump’s Legal Strategy: Forcing the Supreme Court to Rule
I don’t think Trump just stumbled into this fight. Whether it’s intentional or not, he’s forcing the judiciary to rule on fundamental constitutional questions that have been avoided for decades. His cases—on presidential immunity, executive orders, agency authority, and even federal spending—are putting the entire system on trial.
Look at Trump v. United States (2024). The Court ruled that he has absolute immunity for core presidential acts, and even presumptive immunity for most official actions. That decision wasn’t just about him—it was about all future presidents. It essentially said, “You can’t prosecute a president for doing his job.” And it sets the stage for even bigger fights over executive power.
The more I think about it, the more I realize that Trump is playing a long game. He knows that the current Supreme Court is originalist and textualist, which means they’re going to rule in ways that limit government expansion, weaken agencies, and clarify executive power. If that’s his strategy, it’s brilliant.
The Supreme Court: The Ultimate Battleground
If Trump’s strategy is to reshape the legal landscape, then the Supreme Court is his battlefield.
As of 2025, here’s the age breakdown of the justices:
• Clarence Thomas (76)
• Samuel Alito (74)
• Sonia Sotomayor (70)
• John Roberts (70)
• Elena Kagan (64)
I can’t help but think back to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (RBG). In 2020, she refused to retire under Obama, even though everyone saw what was coming. When she passed away, Trump appointed Amy Coney Barrett, flipping the balance of the Court and cementing a 6-3 conservative majority. That changed everything.
Now, the question is: Will Thomas or Alito retire be encouraged by Trump to retire in the next few years? If so, the Supreme Court would be locked into a textualist majority for decades. If that happens, here’s what I think would follow:
• Chevron deference dies, permanently reducing agency power
• The administrative state faces existential challenges
• The presidency gets clearer constitutional limits on spending and executive orders
• More legal challenges force Congress to legislate rather than relying on agencies
This isn’t just another political cycle. It’s a constitutional reset.
The Spending Battle and the First Fight to Not Spend Money
Meanwhile, Washington is facing its first real battle to not spend money. In 1997, Bill Clinton and a Republican Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act, setting a target to eliminate the deficit by 2002. And they actually did it. From 1998 to 2001, we ran surpluses—the last time we had a government that acted responsibly.
Today? We have a $2 trillion deficit and $37 trillion in national debt. And now, Republicans—who used to fight Clinton on spending—are the ones saying we need to cut government.
That’s where the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) comes in. DOGE is actively cutting spending, and that’s raising a massive legal question:
• If Congress appropriates a block of funds without specifying exactly how it must be spent, can the executive branch just refuse to spend it?
Under Clinton v. City of New York (1998), the Line Item Veto Act was ruled unconstitutional, meaning the president can’t just cancel budget items. But what happens when Congress writes a vague appropriation and the executive chooses not to use the money? I think we’re about to find out.
A Constitutional Reset?
As I walked out of class, I kept thinking about how much has changed since 1998. Back then, the question was whether the president had too much power to cut spending. Today, we’re asking whether the executive can refuse to spend money at all.
This entire moment in history is about forcing hard constitutional questions to the surface and answering them definitively. The modern administrative state may not survive it. And maybe, that’s the point.
the answer should be obvious - a budget is an estimate based on information at the time not a mandate - so if the money doesn't need to be spent then it shouldn't
Mr. Blackmon,
Thank you for re-posting this. The opportunity to roll back the FDR overreach goes well beyond the 22nd Amendment. Unfortunately, the effect to limit presidential terms also fostered the ability for non-elected bureaucracy to thrive. Let's hope the Supremes have the spine to put balance back into government, and follow a textualist interpretation of our Constitution.